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Historical  accounting  datasets  about  a  leader  of  the  bond 
rating industry have been gathered in order to provide an 
unprecedented  long  term  view  on  this  business. To  better 
judge  of  the  dynamics  at  play,  similar  data  for 
representatives of older and broader business fields is also 
introduced. Overall, this empirical discussion plays down the 
importance of regulatory « licenses » given to bond rating 
firms and puts forward the coming of a « modern » business 
model where issuers pay for ratings. 
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En utilisant l’historique comptable d’une grande agence de 
notation,  on  fournit  une  vision  sur  le  long-terme  du 
dynamisme de cette activité. Par souci de comparaison, on 
utilise des données semblables pour des activités connexes à 
la  fois  plus  anciennes  et  plus  courantes.  Cela  conduit  à 
relativiser  l’importance  de  l’utilisation  réglementaire  des 
notes et à se concentrer sur la mise en place d’un business 
model « moderne » où les émetteurs paient pour l’activité de 
notation des titres de dettes. 
        
Mots  clés:  étude  industrielle,  notations  d’obligations, 
réglementation financière. 
 

















In the early decades of the past century, a couple of American firms started to provide 
bond ratings and managed to run a lasting business out of it. In the 1930’s, American Financial 
authorities introduced rules relying on these privately issued opinions. This particular way of 
dealing with regulation was then left unchallenged and even extended, particularly over the last 
quarter  of  the  twentieth  century.  Once  authorities  had  started  using  bond  ratings 
straightforwardly, Partnoy (1999, pp. 681-703) argued that private third party certifiers relevant 
to the marketplace were bound to end up mostly providing regulatory benefits or “licenses”.  
To provide a ground for such a “regulatory license” theory, one may want to draw a 
parallel between the profits  of bond raters  and  the extent  of  statutory  rules relying  on  bond 
ratings. This is required to provide more than yet another statement on how the rating business 
might  have  been  regulatory  inflated.  Yet  relevant  data  is  scarce…  This  paucity  of  hard 
information has not fostered the coherence of the views on the bond rating business. For example, 
Partnoy  (2006)  also  argued  that  what  made  the  rating  firms  attractive  to investors  was  their 
involvement in the structured finance issuance boom and the fact that they had repeatedly escaped 
liability in courts.  
What did really matter? More broadly, does the rating business truly appear so special 
that one needs to turn to such “exogenous” factors? In an attempt to deal with these questions, the 
present  paper  introduces  a  number  of  genuine  datasets.  Moody’s  is  the  rating  firm  that  has 
managed to stay independent for the longest time and to go public on the stock market on its own. 
Historical accounting datasets about this corporation then provide an unprecedented long term 
view on the dynamics of the rating business. In particular, since Moody’s changed its business 
model in the late 1960’s, this allows an historical discussion on the role of the  fee structure 
chosen by rating firms.   4 
  Part 1 of this paper gives background information about the development of the rating 
business. Part 2 introduces an empirical discussion using accounting data unavailable to date. The 
two  main  results  are  the  followings.  First,  the  pattern  of  earnings  of  the  early  Moody’s 
corporation does not fit the regulatory license theory well: it becomes less sustainable on the 
wake of the first financial rulings using ratings as straightforward inputs. Not surprisingly, equity 
investors also do not appear to value that much the coming of a regulatory rent. Secondly, when 
rating firms exhibited impressive profitability measures over the early 2000’s, these remain in 
line with a trend that can be traced back to the mid 1970’s and to the transition to an “issuer pay” 
business rating model.  Part 3 provides a discussion of these results by looking at the structure of 
the American bond market since 1945. After 1970, “modern” (publicly available and issuer-paid) 
ratings were of particular interest for foreign corporate bond issuers increasingly entering the 
American bond market and for the new major buyers of non-Treasury bonds (households and 
foreign holders). Concluding remarks comes back on the issue of dealing with two rating business 
models in regulatory discussions on the wake of the structured finance crisis. 
 
 
1 – Some Remarks on the History of the Bond Rating Business  
 
Credit reporting or mercantile credit agencies have sometimes been introduced as the 
main precursors to bond rating firms (see Cantor &Packer (1994, p.1 col b, §1) and Partnoy 
(1999, §2 p.636-§1 p.637)). Sylla (2002, pp. 19-25) introduced a broader perspective by raising a 
simple question: why did rating firms develop that late in bond market history? Indeed, investors 
had been buying bonds since the sixteenth century centuries and a meaningful experience of 
rating  securities  came  as  late  as  the  early  twentieth  century
1. The main reason is that bond 
markets remained mostly sovereign debt markets: businesses in Europe met most of their capital 
needs thanks to bank loans and stock issues. Dating back to the 1850’s and focusing on railroads 
in  its  early  decades, the  corporate  bond  market  can  be  considered  as  an  American  financial 
                                                 
1  This  does  not  mean  that  there  were  no  previous  experiences  with  rating  securities;  but  their  scope 
remained limited. According to the founder of the first rating firm: ”I cannot claim much credit for creating 
the idea, and certainly I think the general use of commercial and credit ratings had something to do with 
bringing the idea of possible bond ratings to my mind. While no one in this country had attempted such a 
thing as investment ratings by means of symbols, yet even in those days bonds were classified into groups 
according  to  quality  and  salability,  especially  by  large  investment  institutions,  such  as  insurance 
companies. Moreover, there had existed for a considerable time, I think, a bond rating system in Vienna 
and also I believe in Berlin. These foreign systems had been developed by symbols, and the  Austrian 
Manual of Statistics, which carried these symbols, was quite well known in Europe, although not at all in 
this country.” (see Harold (1938, p. 11)).    5 
innovation that later spread to the rest of the world. The bond rating business was born out the 
needs  coming  from  this  innovation.  Before  the  creation  of  any  rating  firm,  the  American 
corporate bond market experienced half a century of spectacular growth. This growth went along 
with 3 historical developments that provide a picture of the boundaries of the rating business:  
(i)  the  credit-reporting  or  mercantile  credit  agencies:  The  critical  role  played  by  this 
intermediary in the development of credit lines among American business networks is studied in 
full length by Olegario (2006). Precedents to these institutions developed well before the rise of 
the American corporate bond market, the business however especially took hold over the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Founded in 1841 by L. Tappan, the Mercantile Agency gathered 
information on the business standing and creditworthiness of businesses all over the United States 
through a network of agents and sold reports to subscribers. It became R.G. Dun & Co in 1859. 
The company’s subscribers grew from 7,000 in the 1870’s to 40,000 in the 1880’s, and by 1900 
its reports covered more than a million businesses. In 1849, J. Bradstreet founded a similar firm, 
which by 1857 was publishing what apparently was the world’s first commercial credit rating 
book. In 1933, the Dun and the Bradstreet companies merged to form Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). 
In 1962, Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) acquired Moody’s Investors Service, the bond rating firm that 
J. Moody had created in 1909.   
(ii) the specialized financial press: Over the second half of the nineteenth century, journalists 
created the business of supplying comparative information on the assets and earning power of the 
companies. As the editor of The American Railroad Journal, H. V. Poor gathered and published 
systematic information on the property of railroads, their assets, liabilities and earnings. In 1868, 
he  started  a  firm  to  publish  yearly  his  Manual  of the  Railroads  of  the  United  States,  which 
reported financial and operating statistics for most of the major American  railroads and was 
widely  recognized  as  the  authoritative  source  of  such  information  for  several  decades  (see 
Chandler (1956, chapters 9 and 11)). In 1906, J. Moody entered this business and underwent 
solvency on the wake of the 1907 panic. Reincorporating his company in 1908, he innovated with 
the publication of a rating manual in 1909 (see Harold (1938, pp. 9-12)).  In 1916, the Poor 
Company entered this bond rating business as a natural outgrowth. In 1922, the second new 
entrant, Standard Statistics, was also a financial information company. In 1924, the third and last 
firm to enter the early rating business was the Fitch Publishing Company, a security quotation 
publisher  since  1913.  In  1941,  two  of these  rating  firms  merged  to  form  Standard  &Poor’s 
(S&P). In 1966, S&P was taken over by the publishing giant McGraw &Hill (MG&H).  
(iii) the investment bankers: Flandreau &Flores (2007) studies sovereign bond markets over the 
1820’s and concludes that the hierarchy of underwriters was a proxy for the one of issuers. As   6 
financial  intermediaries  for  the  railroad  securities,  American  great  investment  bankers  had  a 
strong reputation incentive to monitor every deal. Their access to the suppliers of capital through 
a vast network, often international, was at stake. They did act as investors’ insiders, insisting that 
issuers provide all relevant information related to company operations on an ongoing basis and 
sometimes requiring seats on the board of directors of corporations. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, the size of the investing class started to grow and this pivotal role of investment bankers 
started to be questioned. The broad public’s request for more publicly available information on 
the quality of investments first reflected in State “Blue Sky” laws and would later bring both 
mandatory disclosure laws for issuers of securities and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Embedding trust in a number of key individuals was certainly better suited to closed 
networks of wealthy individuals (Sylla (2002, 1 p. 34)). Especially with the 1912-1913 Money 
Trust investigation in mind, the rise of the rating business looks quite contemporaneous to the 
weakening of great investment bankers over the 1920’s. Harold (1938, 2-3 p.16) states that “in no 
circles has the attitude toward bond ratings been more hostile than among investment bankers” 
and mentions a number of attempts to influence ratings by some investment banking houses.  
  Reviewing the three historical precedents, the rating business can be considered at the 
border of two different activities. Historical ties with (i) and (ii) portrays this business as a mere 
development of financial journalism, the purpose of which is to provide relevant information to 
investors. With (iii), however, private certification is stepping in. Great American investment 
bankers did not give reviews on the deals they were selling; they did act as quality certifiers who 
ended up placing people on the board of companies... Sylla (2002, pp. 25; 33) mentions a transfer 
of reputational capital from these quality certifiers to the rating firms and focuses on the historical 
forces that may have led to it. But the extent of this transfer remains unclear…  
Since the development of rating firms came to a standstill with the 1940’s, Partnoy (1999, 
p. 646) argued that any reputation that might have been gained over the 1920’s had quickly gone 
away  on  the  wake  of  the  1929  crisis.  Remember  that  the  market  structure  remained  quite 
concentrated (4 established firms after 1924, back to 3 following the 1941 merger that created 
S&P).  Furthermore,  weakened  market  leaders  of  the  rating  industry  became  external  growth 
opportunities for related business over the 1960’s. This may be interpreted as a poor ability to 
deal with the post World War II (WWII) American capital markets. In any case, at the turn of the 
1970’s, rating firms changed their business model: when they had formerly been selling their 
ratings to investors in every manner manageable, they started charging issuers
2. The reasons for 
                                                 
2 S&P began charging municipal bond issuers in 1968 and most other issuers in 1971, Fitch and Moody’s 
began charging corporate issuers in 1970 (see Cantor &Packer (1994,  p. 4)).   7 
this change still remain to be established (see White (2009, pp. 6-7)). Existing comments can be 
sorted in two broad views of rating industry development: 
 Financial market development: With the post-WWII decades, growth brought more 
stable and higher corporate earnings and this allowed the use of internal funds for investment 
purposes. Market finance was also replaced by other institutional means: over 1948-1965, about 
half of debt securities were privately placed; furthermore, commercial banks introduced term 
loans as an alternative to bond financing (see Atkinson (1967, Chapter II); Sylla (2002, 5 p. 30) 
and (Kemmerer (1952, pp. 459-481)). The change in the fee structure can then be presented as a 
natural outcome of both the poor profitability of a business model dating back to the 1910’s and a 
kind  of  risk  free  environment.  Yet,  explaining  the  pressure  on  a  business  model  is  hardly 
explaining the birth of a new one
3. With the “functional” view introduced above in mind, rating 
firms may be reviving their links with private certification at the onset of a new era of market 
finance. The issuer-pay ratings were first introduced in 1968 by S&P for sub-sovereign issues. 
The increased role of ratings in this field would soon bring public attention (see NYT (1972) and 
Twentieth  Century  Fund  (1974)).  Furthermore,  following  the  Penn  central  default  in  1970, 
commercial  paper  issuers  began  to  solicit  ratings  to  lower  their  capital  costs  and  revitalize 
confidence. This succeeded in changing market perception, a result that certainly expanded the 
market niche for charging issuers (Cantor &Packer (1994, p.4)). Last but not least, comparing 
nineteenth,  early  twentieth  century  and  modern  (1993-2007)  sovereign  bond  underwriting 
practices,  Flandreau  et  al.  (2009b)  provides  results  tending  to  show  that  modern  investment 
bankers outsourced certification tasks to rating firms. 
 Regulation: in the 1930’s, American authorities began to use bond ratings for the 
purpose of regulating bank and insurance investments (see, infra, box 1 p. 12). On the wake of 
the financial difficulties of the early 1970’s, the practice of incorporating ratings in regulatory 
procedures was revived by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in its regulation of broker 
dealer in 1975. This rule referred to “Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations” 
(NRSRO), a new category that paved the way for the use of ratings by other official bodies 
(Partnoy  (1999,  pp.  693-698;  and  2001,  pp.  16-17)  provide  descriptive  statistics  on  how 
regulatory uses mushroomed over the last quarter of the twentieth century in America; JFRAC 
(2009, pp. 87-118) gives a thorough global picture of financial regulations using ratings). As 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3  There have been organizations following the “old” business model since the coming of the modern rating 
business (see BIS (2000, p.25)). Overall, the global rating industry is however heavily weighted toward the 
modern rating business model with an oligopoly allowing the 3 “modern” rating firms (Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch) to own more than 80% of the global market.    8 
regulatory  references  to  ratings  multiply,  ratings  starts  deriving  value  from  ensuring  that  a 
security complies with these regulations. Shifting away from the sale of information to investors, 
bond rating firms may end up merely providing “regulatory licenses” (see (Partnoy (1999, pp. 
681-703)). In any case, regulation first increased demand with regulatory procedures starting in 
the 1930’s and then contracted supply with the NRSRO category as a barrier to entry from 1975 
(White (2002)). The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act targeted the supply side: entry was 
made easier by working on the NRSRO designation process. A focus on regulatory interferences 
tends to downplay the coming of the modern business model. If anything, this evolution may be 
interpreted as a move to better extract a regulatory rent.  
  These two broad views of rating development remain open to debate and pervade most 
discussions on the rating business. As can be seen in appendix A, a recognised source of investor 
research considers the modern Moody’s as a part of the publishing industry (broken down as 
follows:  magazines  (Martha  Stewart  Living),  financial  information  publishers  (McGraw-Hill, 
FactSet,  IHS  Inc.,  Moody's,  Thomson)  and  internet  directories  (R.H.-Donnelley,  Monster 
Worldwide)). On the contrary, Partnoy (2006, p. 67) argued that Moody’s had financial ratios in 
no comparison to major financial publishers and a stock price evolution in no comparison to 
major broker dealers. Partnoy (2006) further put forward three factors to explain the impressive 
business record of the modern Moody’s: the critical role that rating firms played in structured 
products issuance; regulatory benefits or “licenses” and an immunity from civil and criminal 
liability for malfeasance. Which role do these factors really play? for example, Hill (2004, pp. 67-
68) noted evidence of a “sticky institutional norm” favouring two ratings from S&P and Moody’s 
that could not clearly be related to existing regulations. The following empirical analysis aims at 
contributing to this debate. 
 
 
2 – Empirical Analysis 
 
  Since most rating firms are subsidiaries, access to relevant data is a major issue. This 
issue  is  obvious  in  existing  attempts  to  run  “traditional”  industry  analyses  following  the 
“Structure Behavior Performance” breakdown (see White (2002, pp. 44-51) and Smith &Walter 
(2002, pp. 293-305)). Similarly, Flandreau et al. (2009a, pp. 11-12 and table 1) provided by an 
interesting discussion of the interwar rating business that ended up focusing on output and signals 
(number, frequency and price of publications, branching).  Overall, this difficulty has brought a 
pervading use of proxies in analyses of the rating business. Musing on the impact of regulatory 
licenses, Partnoy (1999, pp. 649-650) looks at the workforce and the number of outstanding   9 
ratings as proxies for business activity. Musing on the impact of competition, Becker &Milbourn 
(2008) looks at outstanding American corporate ratings to judge on how market shares evolved 
over 1998-2006. This use of proxy has also been endorsed by regulators. In its first report on 
NRSRO as required by the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) produced a view on competition by looking at outstanding ratings (see SEC 
(2008, pp. 34-36)).  
This paper aims at adding to these analyses by  keeping the discussion on  financials. 
Consider that Moody’s is the only rating firm that went public as an independent corporation and 
that it managed this for quite limited periods of time (1929-1962; 2000-today). For the first time, 
the resulting public accounting information has been compiled into single datasets. Note that 
Moody’s has always been one of the very few leaders of the rating industry. Furthermore, the 
“old”  Moody’s  follows  an  investor-paid  business  model  while  the  “modern”  one  follows  an 
issuer-paid business model. This makes this historical discussion valuable since modern analyses 
of the two business models are bound to compare small competitors to market leaders. To better 
judge of the dynamics at play and to deal with periods when Moody’s is not public, similar 
datasets have been gathered for Dun &Bradstreet (D&B) and McGraw &Hill (MG&H) (that is, 
respectively,  the  credit  reporting  firm  that  controlled  Moody’s  from  1962  to  2000  and  the 
publishing giant that counts S&P as one of its business segment since 1966). These may not be 
the best business peers but they make sense considering the discussion on the history of the rating 
business introduced in section 1
4.  
   
2.1 The bottom line: power in earnings 
 
For any firm, looking at net income brought the greatest historical range. To get a middle 
term view, graph 1 does not display annual figures but rolling 3 year Compound Average Growth 
Rates (CAGR). These rates may be compared to the ones of the business peers evolve and to how 
the profits of all American firms and of all American Finance &Real Estate corporations evolve. 
Graphically,  bear  in  mind  that  any  positive  figure  means  a  positive  growth:  whatever  the 
volatility, a lasting stage of positive figures means good times. 
                                                 
4 Take the example of the interwar period. Flandreau et al. (2009, 4 p. 10) mentioned that business peers 
could be found in other financial information businesses developments “tying advice to data” (business 
forecasts, for instance (see Favero (2007))). Yet finding public data over decades from a typical business 
entity of this kind is quite a challenge (Flandreau et al. (2009, 1 p. 11)). Here, one can still regret that 
McGraw  &Hill (MG&H) is not that associated with financial press at this time. Still, this company is 
dealing with specialized press publishing and will soon step in the financial press. Needless to say, a true 
empirical follow-up to Sylla (2002) would have required continuous accounting data over the 1920’s from 
a credit reporting firm, from a financial press publisher and from an investment banking house.    10 
  From 1925 to 1930, the early Moody’s corporation has an impressive pattern of earnings 
as compared to the average American firm and even to the average American financial firm. After 
the Great Crash, the investor paid rating firm recovers with the real economy (dotted line). This 
means earlier than the average financial company and than MG&H. This recovery does not last 
long though. Bad times start at the end of the 1930’s first in the real economy and then in finance. 
As compared to MG&H, Moody’s first resists better but then it is unable to profit from growth in 
real activity over the early 1940’s. Positive signs appear at the end of the 1940’s but business 
growth is brought to a halt at the turn of the 1950’s. This slowdown is weathered out by MG&H. 
Both Moody’s and D&B suffer the blow, but the rating company shows difficulties earlier and to 
a more preoccupying extent than the mercantile agency. Over the early 1950’s, Moody’s recovers 
yet MG&H and D&B seem well more attractive. This said, for the first time since 1929, a truly 
sustainable pattern of earnings is managed by Moody’s over 1951- 1960. This allows the rating 
company to face the slowdowns in real activity and finance occurring at the end of the 1950’s. 
When D&B settled to buy Moody’s in the early 1960’s, the investor paid rating company was 
indeed an attractive business opportunity. 
  This business record hardly fit the extent of the regulatory rent coming from the use of 
ratings in financial regulations (Partnoy (1999)). As can be seen in box 1, the first rules came at 
the beginning of the 1930’s and the regulatory reliance on ratings reached its full extent at the end 
of the decade. Yet graph 1 shows that Moody’s does not find a sustainable pattern of earnings 
before the early 1950’s and, further, that recovery occurred earlier in related activities. These 
findings  are  quite  unsurprising  considering  that  the  “regulatory  licenses”  came  as  American 
regulators enacted the Securities and Exchange Act (1934). This Act codified mandatory financial 
information  by  corporate issuers:  a  quite  valuable  service  of  early  investor-paid  rating  firms 
would now be obsolete... 
  From 1961 to 1998, graph 1 displays data only for the business peers. MG&H suffered at 
the turn of the 1970’s and of the 1990’s but each time quite quickly recovered. In contrast, D&B 
did not meet troubles before the early 1990’s but then encountered more structural difficulties. 
From 1999, the modern Moody’s power in earnings has proved impressive with most of the 3 
year CAGR well above 20%. This is in sharp contrast with D&B’s experience, but MG&H’s 
earnings have also shown a nice pattern since the second half of the 1990’s. To some extent, the 
expansion of the modern Moody’s is coherent with the pattern of financial profits. This said, the 
rating company has the up side, especially in weathering out a downward trend starting in 2003. 
However, the last observation shows that D&B is the only one to face the bust of the structured 
finance episode.    11 
   12 
* : this box introduces only the first regulations in History, see supra, section 1 p. 7-8 for how the regulatory 
rent evolved through the second half of the twentieth century  


































Box 1 – The Coming of a Regulatory Rent* 
 
Insurance: 
In an answer to the 1931 crisis, the New York State Insurance Department ruled in 1932 that 
bonds  rated  in the first five  rating grades  by one  of the rating agencies would be  considered 
eligible for amortization on a cost basis. The decision was criticized over the 1930’s: extensive 
use of amortization led to dubious valuations in front of quite low market prices. In 1940, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), the follower of the NCIC, however 
stood by this practice and stated that amortization would be given to bond rated: i) in the first four 
grades by two rating agencies, ii) in the first five grades by three agencies or iii) in the first five 
grades by two agencies plus a pricing requirement (priced at 55 or better in September, October, 
and November). In 1953, the NAIC reformulated the eligibility criteria in two tests. “Test 1” was a 
rating from the first four rating grades of one of the accredited agencies or a number of balance 
sheet requirements. “Test 2” mainly dealt with earnings requirements (see Atkinson (1967)) 
 
Banking 
By 1930, the Federal Reserve had begun using bond ratings in their examination of member bank 
portfolios. This use could be considered “informal”. In 1931, the Comptroller of the Currency 
officially adopted ratings to measure national banks’ bond quality: bonds rated Baa/BBB or above 
would be carried at cost; bonds with lower ratings would be marked to market thanks to fractional 
write-offs. In tune with previous insurance practices, this ruling was well received at the time (see 
WSJ  (1931a  &b);  Harold  (1938,  p.27)).  During  the  following  years,  many  State  banking 
superintendents adopted the Comptroller’s plan (see Harold (1938, pp. 27-28)). 
In 1935, Amendments to the Federal Banking Act specified that all national banks were subject to 
the orders of the Comptroller’s Office as for the securities they might purchase for their own 
accounts. On February, 15th 1936, the Comptroller issued a new ruling stating that “the purchase 
of investment securities in which the investment characteristics are distinctly and predominantly 
speculative,  or  investment  in  securities  of  a  lower  designated  standard  than  those  which  are 
distinctly and predominantly speculative, is prohibited”. A footnote added that “the terms applied 
herein may be found in recognized rating manuals” (see Harold, (1938 p. 30)). This more radical 
decision spurred unprecedented hostility about the use of bond ratings as tools to influence the 
structure of commercial banks portfolios (see WSJ (1936a &b)). It also created confusion about 
what  the  footnote  exactly  meant  because  it  was  relying  on  an  unsettled  market  convention: 
Moody’s kept interpreting the ruling as pointing to Baa/BBB as a cutoff but the American Banker 
considered A/A (see MIS (2004, pp. 1-2)). The Comptroller refused to make this point clear and 
then stated that ratings were not “the sole criterion, or even a necessary criterion, for judging 
whether or not a particular bond was eligible for purchase by a national bank” (see WSJ (1936c 
&d)). Nonetheless, controversies did not quiet down (see WSJ (1936e)). On June 27
th, 1938, all 
the federal banking authorities published a  joint statement more in tune with the  1931 ruling: 
bonds would be divided into groups and that bond issues bearing any of the first four rating grades 
were to be given a privileged status (by being valued at their purchase price or at par and by being 
therefore insulated from day-to-day price fluctuations).  
The use of ratings by all banking authorities was now clearly set. For individual banks, this meant 
that informational requirements and uncertainties would be minimized for investments in the top 
four rating categories while lower rated or even unrated bonds would require an ad ded burden of 
justification. In 1949, the Executive Committee of the National Association of Supervisors of 
State Banks joined the Federal authorities in reaffirming the process outlined by the 1938 
statement (see Federal Reserve (1949)).   13 
  2.2 Financial ratios 
 
  Using accounting data, a number of financial ratios can be drawn over the past 80 years. 
A natural starting point is to look at basic profitability measures.  
  First, graph 2 displays Returns on Asset (ROA). The early Moody’s had a rate of return 
always above 20% before 1931. Up to 1950, this ratio still proved advantageous to the investor 
paid rating firm as compared to MG&H and D&B. The three businesses then settled for similar 
figures around 10-15%. Plotted against MG&H, D&B has the downside from the early 1940’s to 
the early 1960’s. The situation is then strikingly reversed and this occurred at the time when 
Moody’s was incorporated as a business line... The modern issuer paid Moody’s displays very 
high and volatile ROA. A sharp upward trend over 1996-1999 is brought to a halt in 2000. The 
recoveries are always ended by further declines but the ROA remains very impressive (>25%): 






  Secondly, to better assess any bias due to asset management policies, graphs 3 and 4 
provide profit margins. Graph 3 gives straight profit margins. In 1928,  Moody’s was able to 
extract 18, 56 cents of net profit out of every dollar of sales. Despite a downward trend, this 
investor paid corporation had a better profit margin than MG&H until 1950 and than D&B until 
1957. The modern Moody’s corporation starts in tune with MG&H in 1996 but then displays an 
impressive upward trend until 2006. Although it is a close call in 2008, Moody’s has always 
extracted more than quarter of net income out of every dollar of sales. Furthermore, it managed 




  Graphs 4a &b differ from graph 3 by looking at “raw” profits. Unfortunately, the data starts 
when good times are over for the old Moody’s corporation. Nevertheless, Graph 4a brings a new light 
on the comparison between the investor-paid Moody’s and MG&H. From 1935 to 1951, looking at 
operating margins completely change the picture of graphs 2 and 3 to the advantage of MG&H. This is 
quite welcome since this new picture is more in tune with the net earnings dynamics displayed in 
graph 1. Turning to the right-hand side of the graph, the modern Moody’s corporation again appears to 
be something else by extracting between 30 to 60 cents in operating income out of every dollar of 
sales.  The  modern  Moody’s  started  with  an  operating  margin  well  above  the  ones  D&B’s  and 
MG&H’s. Furthermore, this margin grew at a fast pace when the two others stayed between 15% and 
30%. 
  Looking at raw profits, segment reporting from D&B and MG&H can be used in an attempt to 
overcome  Moody’s  accounting  data  limitations.  Graph  4b  then  shows  operating  margins  for  the 
modern Moody’s next to the business lines incorporating rating firms. By starting from the right, note 
how the profitability of MG&H’s financial services division shows a trend keen to the one of the 
modern Moody’s. Furthermore, the financial service division of MG&H displays an impressive trend 
line going back to 1975.  Such a trend could hardly be achieved without a steady and long term 
profitability of the modern rating business. This interpretation is further confirmed by the operating 
margins of the D&B business line incorporating Moody’s from 1969 to 1988.  





  Such  an  interpretation  tends  to  downplay  numerous  statements  made  on  the  wake  of  the 
structured finance crisis. Most commentators had ended up associating the impressive profitability 
measures from rating firms to their involvement in structured finance securities issuance during the 
speculative episode of the early 2000’s. Going into more details, the SEC showed that staffing among 
the three leaders of the rating business followed the rise in activity and in revenues in the RMBS field 
but not in the CDO field (see Appendix B). This certainly raises issues about business management. 
This said, overall, the recent profitability of the leaders of the rating industry remains in line with a 
trend that can be traced back to the mid 1970’s. This trend occurred on the wake of the transition to the 
modern “issuer pay” business rating model in the early 1970’s.   16 
2.3 The opinion of the stock market 
 
  When  each  of  the  ratios used  above  has  some  advantages, it is  generally  held  that  stock 
markets generate better estimates than any model using financials as inputs. For this reason, graph 5 
provides historical Price to Earnings (P/E) ratios. This measure has some disadvantages. First, low or 
negative earnings per share bring hardly informative extreme values. Secondly, this measure may be 






  The old Moody’s corporation went public in October 1928. Over 1929, Moody’s stock was on 
average bought at more than 8 times its earnings, as compared to more than 10 for MG&H’s stock and 
for the SP500 average. Moody’s stock endured the market crash yet equity investors’ confidence never 
came back to pre-crisis levels: the P/E moved around 5 up to 1939. As for the comparison to the 
business peers, extreme values aside, the reference point for MG&H remained somewhere around 10 
until 1938. Note that confidence fades from 1937 to 1941 and that this holds for Moody’s, MG&H and 
the SP500. It seems that equity investors do not see a particular windfall in the final rulings standing 
by the use of ratings as inputs and establishing the regulatory license for an undetermined period of 
time (see, supra, box 1: 1938 for banking and 1940 for insurance). From 1941 on, the SP500 bounces 
back and MG&H quickly recovers to reach the 10 P/E reference point in 1945. Moody’s P/E also 
recovers but stagnates; thankfully it does not suffer the market slowdown occurring over the second 
half of the 1940’s. Looking at 1949 and 1950, it is still an open shot between Moody’s, MG&H and 
D&B. An upward trend starts in 1950, and Moody’s appears standing aside from it by remaining 
around a 5 reference point. By contrast, D&B early takes the up side to the SP500 while MG&H 
exhibit volatility before consistently beating the market at the end of the decade.    17 
  The SP500 P/E stagnates over the 1960’s as compared to both MG&H and D&B. Things do 
not change for the best with the 1970’s. A couple of years aside, MGH’s P/E ratio remained aligned to 
the SP500 average over the last quarter of the century. Considering the last decade, the reference point 
for this stock would be somewhere between 20 and 25. D&B managed the slowdown of the 1970’s 
better than MG&H. These good times ended in the late 1980’s: D&B de-correlated from the SP500 
average and exhibited volatility. Over the last decade, a reference point for this stock would be around 
20.  In  September  2000,  the  modern  Moody’s  corporation  concluded  its  spin-off  from  D&B. 
Confidence in the future of this independent rating entity was high among investors: over 2000, they 
proved on average ready to pay more than 50 times Moody’s earnings to become shareholders. The 
P/E ratio then evolved but the reference point for this company could still be thought around 50 until 
2004. Confidence has then strikingly faded… Moody’s line joined the one of MG&H in 2006 and the 
three lines became one over 2007-2008. Bear in mind that equity investor trust in a dedicated rating 
entity like Moody’s eroded well before any public concern over structured finance securities. 
 
 
3 – Result Discussion: the Structure of the American Bond Market since 1945 
   
  Is there something so special about the rating business that one needs to turn to exogenous 
factors? To  deal  with  this  question,  a  narrow  business  analysis  is  hardly  enough.  Musing  on the 
historical development of rating firms Sylla (2002, 3 p. 33) pointed to macroeconomic factors and 
mentioned “historical rhymes” between the 1920’s and the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
  In an attempt to further link the history of rating firms to the one of the American corporate 
bond market, this section provides descriptive statistics allowing a discussion of the microeconomic 
figures presented above. These statistics rely on a normalized body of datasets going to date (the 
Federal Reserve flow of funds). This is not the case for information on earlier periods. For the sake of 
comparison, some data from the most common sources on 1900-1945 are given in appendix C but the 
discussion here will focus on the post-World War II decades.   
  The  first  matter of interest  is  whether  the  coming  of  financial  globalization  and  financial 
deregulation brought unprecedented levels of bonded debt after 1970. On graph 6, a striking feature is 
the decrease of Federal bonded debt which has steadily freed capital over the post world-war II era. 
Another important point is that other areas of the American bond market have not that benefited of this 
structural  change.  American  sub-sovereign  government  and  corporate  bond  market  issues  have 
remained around a 10% level achieved by the late 1950’s.  Municipals then settled to a 8% level after 
1995. The American corporate bond market share proves a little more volatile: there is a 12% peak 
over 1969-1971, a 8 % low over the mid-1980’s and a 12% peak over the early 2000’s. The rise of 
American  corporate  bond  levels  over  the  second  half  of  the  1990’s  seems  to  benefit  from  the 
decreasing share of Treasuries over 1995-2001. Overall, the main long term trend of interest is the   18 
rising share of foreign corporation bonds since the 1990’s: when this share had been below 2% since 
1945, a steady growth brought it around 4% since 2003. This means good business for modern issuer 
paid rating firms: is there a better way than buying the services of this intermediary to manage a bond 
issue on the American field? By providing a perspective on the relative importance of three fields at 
the core of rating activities, graph 6  mostly evidences a straightforward consequence of financial 






   
  When graph 6 provided a look on shares in the supply of credit market debt, Graphs 7a &b 
turn to the demand side: who are the key holders of American &Foreign corporate bond issues and of 
American sub-sovereign issues? These are the ones truly benefiting of the existence of a pervading 
bond rating system. 
  Graph 7a gives the holdings of sub-sovereign American credit market debt. At the beginning 
of  the  1970’s  starts  a  dramatic  decrease  of  commercial  bank  holdings.  The  share  of  insurance 
companies then also starts decreasing. This structural change  reaffirms households and non-profit 
organizations as major holders of municipal debt. Furthermore, over the 1980’s, the share of mutual 
funds rises from negligible to more than 20%. Overall, these changes portray a shift from traditional 
institutional investors to the investing public. While ratings may have some coordinating values for 
institutional investors, households and individuals may be more eager to check these specialized third 
party opinions.  
   
 






  Graph 7b gives the holdings of corporate and foreign bonds. A major feature is the long term 
decrease in the share of life insurance companies. This decrease is first compensated by a rising share 
of pension and government retirement funds. But this share stagnates from the mid-1960’s to the early 
1980’s. The structural decrease in life insurance holdings is then eventually compensated by two 
structural changes. First, there is a recovery in household holdings starting in the mid 1960’s. Brought 
to a halt in the late 1970’s, it bounces back over the 1980’s as pension and government retirement fund 
holdings start dropping. Secondly, there is an impressive growth in foreign holdings. The growth starts  
Graph 7a - Share of Total Municipal Securities &Loans Holdings 
Graph 7b - Share of Total Corporate &Foreign Bonds Holdings   20 
in the late 1960’s yet the share of foreign holdings remains under 8% until 1981. This share then 
increased  at  a  fast  pace  and  dominates  since  2006.  Again,  these  remarks  point  to  a  shift  from 
traditional institutional investors to holders that greatly benefit from publicly available third-party 
rating on bond quality. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks: Two Businesses and One Issue for Regulatory Policy 
 
 
  Ratings were for long an American bond market feature. Thanks to the financial globalization 
starting in the 1970’s, they have now become a key institution of the global bond market. Over recent 
years, the role of major rating firms in the structured finance episode has been discussed in news 
editorials and political circles. On the wake of heavy market disruptions, this heated debate reached an 
unprecedented scale when basic knowledge on the rating business is still missing.  
  This is a concern when regulators are bound to act against such a background. There was little 
detailed discussion on competition in the rating business when the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act was passed as a “duopoly relief” regulation. Opening public registration to new entrants was 
certainly a good thing; yet it was bound to do little about market shares since market leaders enjoy 
strong reputational advantages (see Hill (2004, 4-6 p. 85)). The policy move  did little more than 
bringing  major  rating  firms  under  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  authority  and 
requiring a number of key disclosures (information on interest conflicts management, performance 
statistics, methodologies, etc.).  
  In December 2008, the SEC adopted new rules of this kind as a policy response to the role of 
ratings in structured finance. The agency had proposed to force full disclosure of rating histories to 
allow better performance assessments. This was hardly manageable for investor-paid rating firms and 
the final rule settled for a limited and random disclosure (see SEC (2009) on rule 17g-2). This episode 
clearly  shows  that  dealing  with  two  businesses  in  one  remains  an  issue  for  current  regulatory 
initiatives. Furthermore, sketching a competition policy remains a challenge for regulators. A former 
insider of the rating industry links troubles with structured finance ratings to competitive pressures 
allowing  arrangers  to take  advantage  of  “rating  shopping”  (Fons  (2008, p.  7)).  After a  year-long 
inquiry and campaign by the New York State Attorney, the “Cuomo agreement” precisely targeted 
related bad practices (see Cuomo (2008)). Moody’s (2009) publicly acknowledged that the credit 
rating industry needed third-party help in order to properly deal with competition and information 
disclosure. In December 2008, an ambitious move was set aside by the SEC. Re-proposed in February 
2009,  this  proposal  would  force  information  sharing  between  an  issuer-paid  rating  firm  and  its 
NRSRO competitors (both issuer-paid and investor-paid, see SIFMA (2009) commenting rule 17g-5). 
This would certainly fundamentally change the shape of competition in the rating business.    21 
  This  initiative  aside,  an  open  question  is  whether  competition  policy  should  discriminate 
between the two existing rating business models. Drawing on Moody’s history, this paper provided an 
unprecedented discussion on this issue. While this company has always been one of the few leaders of 
the rating industry, it was paid by investors until the early 1970’s and has then been paid by issuers. 
Looking at a number of financial ratios, the modern issuer paid rating firm indeed appears to be 
something else. A number of arguments have been put forward to explain this profitability:  
 
(i)        the pervasive use of ratings in financial regulations,  
(ii)       the little success of  legal cases brought against rating firms 
(iii)       the involvement in the structured finance issuance boom.  
   
 
  This paper provided a new perspective on these arguments. First, the business record of the 
early  Moody’s  corporation  shows  no  particular  windfall  in  the  coming  of  the  first  American 
regulations using ratings as a straightforward input (i). Note, by the way, that Moody’s has for long 
publicly  supported  the  withdrawal  of  ratings  from  financial  regulations  (see,  for  example,  MIS 
(1995)). Secondly, Moody’s recent profitability is in line with profitability trends that started in the 
1970’s and this suggests paying more attention to the coming of a modern business model (iii). 
  Whence comes “modern” ratings success? Musing on the factors listed above provides little 
insight if the state of fixed income markets is missing. Ratings are nothing but an institution of capital 
markets and the discussion must somehow turn to macroeconomics (Sylla (2002, 3 p. 33)). Reviewing 
the structure of the American credit market since 1945, two points may help to understand the success 
of modern ratings. On the one hand, American issuer-paid ratings were particularly interesting for a 
rising star of credit market borrowing over the last quarter of the twentieth century: foreign corporate 
bond issuers. On the other hand, the holdings of non-Treasury bonds show a decrease in the share of 
major  institutional  investors  compensated  by  an  increase  in  the  one  of  households  and  foreign 
holdings.  These  holders  are  great  beneficiaries  of  the  public  good  feature  of  issuer-paid  ratings 
(commented by Schwarcz (2002, 3 p.8)). These two points are first steps in building a better picture of 
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Appendix B – The SEC’s View on Structured Finance Business 
Management  
 
Source: SEC (2008c, p. 10-11) 
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The graph above gives a view of the supply side. Note that publicly held Federal debt comes on the 
wake of World War I and from then on it seems to negatively correlate with the amount of corporate 
bond outstanding. When the share of municipals remains quite stable, a rise in the share of treasuries 
seems to answer a decrease in the one of corporate (and inversely). Pay attention to the fact that, from 
1929  to  the  end  of the  1940’s,  municipals  stagnate  and corporates  decrease.  Non-Treasury  credit 
market borrowing is levelling-off for years and in 1934 the Security and Exchange Act changes the 
need for financial information of corporate investors. Here are two structural factors that may explain 
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Turning to the demand side, the most impressive figures are the total share of financial intermediaries, 
which, at the turn of the 1940’s, rises above 60% on both graphs. This intermediation of credit market 
borrowing is a key feature that will last for decades after World War II (see, supra, section 1, p. 7). 








For corporate and foreign holdings, the share of all financial intermediaries rises steadily. As for the 
1920’s, the main channel is the traditional banking system something that can more easily seen in the 
figures reported by Guthmann (1950). On the wake of the 1929 market crash, the decrease in these 
holdings  leaves  the  field  open  for  a  complete  predominance  of  life  insurers’  holdings.  For  sub-
sovereign holdings, savings institutions were the major intermediary at the beginning of the century. 
Their share has then decreased dramatically.  Note also the increasing share of commercial banks 
starting at the end of the 1920’s, which correspond to the decrease in their corporate and foreign 
holdings documented corporate and foreign holdings. 
 
 